Backup and recovery requirements in Australia don’t come from one law. They come from several sources, depending on what an organisation does: prudential standards from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) for banks, insurers and super funds, the Security of Critical Infrastructure (SOCI) Act for operators of critical infrastructure, and cyber frameworks published by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), which many other organisations use as a benchmark. Cyber insurers add their own questions at renewal.
None of them prescribes a product. Read side by side, they share three expectations: backups that a compromise of production can’t reach, recovery that has been tested rather than assumed, and accountability for recovery that sits with leadership.
Which rules apply to your organisation?
| Sector | Applies directly | Applies indirectly or as a benchmark |
|---|---|---|
| Banking, insurance and superannuation | APRA CPS 230 and CPS 234, for APRA-regulated entities | Essential Eight*, referenced by APRA |
| Energy, utilities and water | SOCI Act risk management program, for assets that meet critical infrastructure thresholds | Essential Eight*, Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework |
| Transport and logistics | SOCI Act risk management program, for freight assets that meet the thresholds | Essential Eight* |
| Healthcare | SOCI Act risk management program, for a small number of designated hospitals listed in the rules. Private health insurers are APRA-regulated | Essential Eight* |
| Higher education | A SOCI sector, but the risk management program obligation does not currently apply to universities | Essential Eight* |
| Manufacturing and others | No recovery-specific regulation in most cases | Cyber insurers, customer contracts, Essential Eight* |
Thresholds matter. Whether a particular asset counts as critical infrastructure depends on definitions in the SOCI Act and its rules, so many mid-market organisations in these sectors are not directly captured.
APRA: banks, insurers and super funds
APRA-regulated entities face some of the most specific recovery requirements in Australia. Under CPS 230, the board must approve tolerance levels for each critical operation, including the maximum disruption and data loss the entity would accept, and the entity must test that it can stay within them. Since 1 July 2026, that has applied in full to every regulated entity, including smaller ones that had an extra year.
APRA has also been specific about where backups fall short. In June 2024 it wrote to every regulated entity about three common weaknesses:
- Backups not isolated enough from production, so a compromise of one could compromise the other
- Testing that didn’t confirm backups were protected from unauthorised access or change
- Testing that didn’t show systems and data could be recovered within tolerance levels
APRA said entities should review their backups against those issues, and treat any gap that could materially affect their risk profile as a notifiable control weakness under CPS 234, APRA’s information security standard.
The SOCI Act: critical infrastructure operators
For a defined list of critical infrastructure asset classes, including electricity, gas, water, data storage, food and grocery, freight and a small number of designated hospitals, the responsible entity must maintain a written critical infrastructure risk management program. It has to address four kinds of hazard: cyber and information security, personnel, supply chain, and physical and natural hazards. Each year, a report on the program must be approved by the entity’s board, council or other governing body, where it has one, and lodged within 90 days of the end of the financial year.
The baseline program doesn’t name backups. It does require compliance with a recognised cyber security framework, such as the Essential Eight at Maturity Level One, ISO/IEC 27001, the NIST framework, the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) or the Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework (AESCSF). If the Essential Eight is the framework, backup and tested restoration are part of the baseline.
The bar is rising for some sectors. Enhanced rules took effect on 10 June 2026 for nine higher-risk asset classes, including electricity, gas, liquid fuel, water, energy market operator, freight infrastructure and freight services assets. They lift the required cyber framework, for example to Essential Eight Maturity Level Two, and they name recovery directly: entities must have a process to recover and restore critical systems after an incident, and to keep the asset available while that happens. Most of the enhanced requirements must be met by 10 June 2028.
The Essential Eight and the new ASD Essentials
The Essential Eight is mandatory for some government entities and widely used as a benchmark elsewhere. Its backup strategy at Maturity Level One requires, among other things:
- Backups performed and retained in line with business criticality and business continuity requirements
- Backups kept in a secure and resilient manner
- Restoration tested as part of disaster recovery exercises
- Users without privileged access prevented from modifying or deleting backups
At Maturity Level Three, even backup administrator accounts can’t modify or delete backups during their retention period, which is what an immutable copy provides. We’ve written about what immutability actually means and where it stops.
On 15 October 2026, ASD published the ASD Essentials, which it describes as an evolution of the Essential Eight. Its backup principle is “regular and proven backups”, which expects backups to be secure and proven, not just taken. It also makes the board or executive committee accountable for cyber security. The Essential Eight remains available, and the critical infrastructure rules still name it, but new planning is worth doing against the Essentials.
Cyber insurers
For organisations outside these regimes, renewal is often where recovery gets examined. Applications commonly ask whether backups are isolated from the network, whether immutable copies exist, and when a restore was last tested. We’ve covered the three gaps insurers are finding at renewal.
What the rules have in common
Read together, the regimes converge on three expectations, whichever one applies to you.
- Backups a compromise can’t reach. APRA asks for isolation from production. The Essential Eight restricts who can modify or delete backups, up to backup administrators at the highest level.
- Recovery that has been tested. CPS 230 tests against tolerance levels, the Essential Eight requires restoration testing in disaster recovery exercises, the enhanced critical infrastructure rules require a process to recover and restore critical systems, and ASD’s new framework calls for backups to be proven. A backup job completing does not meet any of them. Our article on what a recovery test should produce covers the evidence.
- Accountability at leadership level. APRA’s boards approve recovery limits, critical infrastructure boards approve an annual report, and the ASD Essentials makes the board or executive committee accountable for cyber security.
For an organisation that isn’t directly regulated, these three expectations are the benchmark. For one that is, they’re the minimum.
How to check where you stand
- Could a compromise of your production environment, including an administrator account, reach your backups?
- When was recovery last tested, how much of the environment did the test cover, and was it timed?
- Who in your leadership has agreed how long critical systems can be down, and how much data loss is acceptable?
- Could you show the evidence to a regulator, auditor or insurer without assembling it first?
What a recovery arrangement should be able to show
Whichever rules apply, it’s worth asking any recovery provider, including Evolution Systems, to evidence isolated and immutable copies, timed and documented recovery tests, ownership defined before an incident, and reporting leadership can review. Evolution Data Resilience is a managed recovery service built around exactly those points.
Last reviewed November 2026. This article summarises regulatory requirements and is not legal or regulatory advice. Whether an obligation applies to a specific organisation depends on the relevant legislation and standards.
FAQs
Is backup legally required in Australia?
No single law sets backup and recovery requirements for every organisation. They come from sector-specific rules, mainly APRA’s prudential standards for banks, insurers and super funds, and the SOCI Act’s risk management program for critical infrastructure operators. Most other organisations use the Australian Signals Directorate’s frameworks as a benchmark, and cyber insurers set expectations at renewal.
Does the Essential Eight require backups to be tested?
Yes. At Maturity Level One, restoration of data, applications and settings from backups must be tested as part of disaster recovery exercises.
Has the Essential Eight been replaced?
On 15 October 2026, the Australian Signals Directorate published the ASD Essentials, which it describes as an evolution of the Essential Eight. The Essential Eight remains available, and the SOCI Act’s risk management program rules still name it.
Does the SOCI Act require backups?
Not by name. Responsible entities for specified critical infrastructure assets must maintain a risk management program and comply with a recognised cyber security framework. If that framework is the Essential Eight, backups and tested restoration are part of the baseline. For nine higher-risk asset classes, enhanced rules that took effect in June 2026 also require a process to recover and restore critical systems after an incident.
What did APRA find wrong with backups?
In June 2024, APRA told all regulated entities it had seen three common weaknesses: insufficient isolation between production and backup environments, testing that didn’t confirm backups were protected from compromise, and testing that didn’t show recovery within tolerance levels.
What do the regulations have in common?
Three expectations: backups that a compromise of production can’t reach, recovery that has been tested rather than assumed, and accountability for recovery at leadership level.